

Reshaping Regional Order: Regional Powers and Challengers, 1950-2010.

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Introduction

Despite the millions of words that have been written about globalization, despite the ease with which money travels across borders, despite new global communication technologies, and despite the apparent reach of determined and dedicated dark networks of terrorist organizations and criminal syndicates, the reality of international politics is that most countries exist in their own neighborhoods and do most of their work in their own regions. Most conflicts occur between contiguous states over natural resources, the migration of their citizens, or border disputes, although they often cause critical ripple effects across their neighborhoods, the region in which they are nested, and sometimes the global political system. Most cooperative architectural arrangements that have been created by states are also basically regional or sub-regional in nature (Volgy et al 2009). Even in an era of a global liberal economic order, most trade relations are conducted between contiguous states, or at best, regional partners.

This preeminence of the regional context of international politics in an era of “globalization” is not the case for all states. Some, such as Singapore, have specialized in policies (at least economic) that aim at the global market. And clearly, major powers, almost by definition, pursue policies and objectives that aim beyond their neighborhoods and regions and are vitally interested in effectuating the nature of global orders. Yet, such states are few and far between. At present, the actual *global* military reach of major powers is perhaps restricted to one (the U.S.); the extra-regional military reach of major powers that include France, the UK and the Russian Federation barely reach across one or two other regions beyond their own. China’s “blue water” navy barely covers critical spots in its neighborhood and has been heavily dependent on Russian technology, despite its status as a global power. Germany, emerging as a very powerful

state after unification following the end of the Cold War, flirted with global policies, but has reduced its military capabilities substantially since the end of the Cold War and ultimately appears to have accepted its role as the leading regional power in Europe.¹ Japan's global power status has suffered greatly from its internal, domestic economic problems and finds itself at odds with other regional actors. Regional powers such as India and Brazil have been trying to play a more assertive role on the global diplomatic stage, yet their forays into other regions, especially into Africa, has exposed the weaknesses of their relatively small diplomatic infrastructures and limited capabilities outside of their regions.

Even those states we consider to be major global powers, and regional powers that aspire to be major global powers, have historically been focused on their regions first and foremost before enlarging their foreign policy orientations. Often, these regional powers are forced to focus their attention on other powerful or active challenger states within their regions, and may only be able to operate in a more global role once such challenges are resolved. For example, Brazilian aspirations for a role beyond South America did not arise until its major challenger (Argentina) no longer appeared to be a significant threat. India's willingness to play on a stage larger than South Asia was an exception during the Cold War but appeared to be functioning sporadically until Pakistan had been sufficiently weakened and their rivalry became less of a security threat. Japan consolidated its regional influence more than a century ago before it sought to create a larger global role for itself immediately before and after its war with Russia, but is now forced to focus its attention back toward the region, challenged by China for dominance. Likewise, continued, unsettled conflicts within regions (South Asia, East Asia, Middle East, and even the growing animosities between the powers inside the EU and their Eastern European

¹ See "Europe's Reluctant Hegemon," *The Economist*, June 15, 2013:3-16

counterparts) severely limit the abilities of major European states to play in global as opposed to regional and neighborhood politics.

Thus, explanations of international politics that focus on the global system, while highly useful and setting a highly salient context for theorizing, need to be embedded in another set of theories that focus on the dynamics of regions and particularly in a comparative analysis of regional politics (Acharya 2007). Ultimately, a comprehensive theory of international politics needs to integrate three levels of analysis: theories of foreign policy, theories of regional politics, and theories of global politics. Of the three, there has been strong theoretical development in two of these fields. However, a comprehensive, comparative theory of regional politics has lagged far behind,² obstructed by conceptual and theoretical fights in the field, along with insufficient systematic empirical testing of critical propositions.³

Our objective in this effort is quite modest. We do not offer a major theoretical breakthrough or build the definitive highway that scholars can travel and create the integration that is necessary across the three perspectives. Our more limited aim is to offer a framework that hopefully will elicit constructive debate over what should be the appropriate contours of a theory of comparative regional international political analysis: one that will also point to systematically testable propositions regarding which regional considerations appear to be consistently more salient than others; and provide a framework that allows the beginnings of creating useful linkages between the three levels of analysis. In doing so, we have applied this approach to identifying the presence or absence of regional subsystems and their change over time (Cline et

² For two recent exceptions, see Miller 2007 and Rasler and Thompson 2014.

³ This appears to be the case even though most large-N systematic analyses of international political conflicts, for instance, when controlling for arbitrarily designated meta-regions in their models typically find that region adds a significant control variable in the analysis. Clearly, the regional context in which states and dyads are embedded appears to matter in such studies.

al. 2011; Rhamey et al. 2014), the identification of regional powers (Cline et al. 2011), and the foreign policy consequences of domestic politics and regional hierarchy (Rhamey 2012).

Building on this research program, this paper (1) reviews our theoretical framework for regional analysis; (2) expands the identification of regional powers and challengers to the Cold War time period; and (3) generates some initial empirical propositions about the types of regional challenger-power relationships and their implications for regional conflict and cooperation.

In differentiating between regional powers and regional challengers, we incorporate existing research on status and its attribution (Volgy et al. 2011; Volgy et al. 2014).⁴ While there are some theoretical similarities to hierarchical approaches (Organski 1958; Lemke 2002; Lake 2011), our analysis goes beyond simple observations of capabilities to also include the willingness to engage the regional space and levels of status attribution within the regional context. By analyzing regional hierarchical relationships through this more nuanced status-centric approach, we are able to not only identify regional powers, which possess capabilities, willingness, and regional status (Cline et al. 2011), but three types of regional challengers: weak challengers, lacking significant capabilities but active and granted status by region members; reluctant challengers, with significant capabilities and status but lacking consistent willingness to engage in significant involvement in the region; and status deficient challengers, that possess both significant capabilities and willingness but are not granted significant status by other region members. Consistent with recent work on status that explores the behaviors of major power typologies contingent upon their degree of status (Corbetta et al. 2013), these status deprived challengers are likely to be the most conflictual within the regional context.

⁴ For a complete recent discussion of this topic, see the edited volume from Paul et al. (2014).

Finally we offer two caveats before we continue: first, we do not mean to imply that global processes do not exist. In fact they do, involving economics, politics, technology, communications, environmental concerns, migration patterns, and increasingly desperate attempts at global governance. We are keenly aware as well that major powers, especially the strongest ones, seek to order global politics, that globalization dynamics have important consequences for the well-being of many states, that there exist numerous global norms of appropriate conduct for states that are followed voluntarily by many states, and that global governance, however difficult and often piecemeal, is also a reality in a number of issue areas. Whatever comparative conclusions we are able to provide in this brief exploration of regional power-challenger dynamics, we also acknowledge that regions are nested within a systemic context of major powers whose behaviors vary across regional subsystems. Indeed, the degree of major power involvement and ability to establish order is likely a significant contributor to the levels of peace or conflict within a regional subsystem (see Rhamey et al. 2014). The critical theoretical and empirical questions for us, however, are the extent to which such global dynamics clash with regional realities, and the circumstances under which one or the other may dominate regional politics.

Second, we will not review here the voluminous literature on regions. There is a plethora of work on the subject, ranging from the work of area studies scholars, regional specialists, realists, constructivists, liberal theorists, post-modernists, cultural theorists, economists, legal scholars, political scientists, linguists, geographers, sociologists and international relations scholars. An adequate review of that literature requires at least a book-length manuscript and we are indebted to most of those who have labored in these vineyards. Here, we cite only a small handful of research efforts that have direct bearing on our theoretical framework.

What we mean by region

It is a sad commentary on the state of the literature that Thompson's (1973) seminal article (and critique) is still cited to underscore the shortcomings in the literature on regions: to wit, he found no fewer than dozens of major and often contradictory definitions of the concept. Depending on one's theoretical orientation, little agreement still exists in the literature about an appropriate definition. The conceptual range is quite large, including those who simply assume that one should know the contours of regions, to others who specify meta-regions (Katzenstein 2005), to others who define regions in terms of the existence of formal, cooperative architecture that delineates its boundaries (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Katzenstein 1998; Sbragia 2008; Haftel 2007; Goertz and Powers 2009), or classify geopolitical spaces by cultural or religious considerations (Huntington 1997; Hymans 2002; Young 2002). Amongst all of these studies, few have attempted to create a conceptual approach that is matched by empirical criteria for what constitutes a region and the states that form its population.

In our work, we adopt the Rhamey (2012) conception of region originally applied to the identification of regional powers in Cline et al. (2011), one that appears to have overcome some of these shortcomings: "clusters of politically relevant states with mutual recognition of relevance through their foreign policy actions" (p. 122). Consistent with most conceptualizations, the definition requires minimal geographic proximity for regional membership of either direct territorial contiguity or at most separation by 400 miles of water. Therefore, Egypt may be part of the Middle East or the Maghreb, but certainly not part of Asia regardless of its patterns of interactions. Yet, proximity is insufficient for delineating regional boundaries. We require as well that members within a region exhibit similar patterns of political and economic interactions as observed in events data. Such a multidimensional requirement suggests that a state may be in

geographical proximity to its neighbors, but would not be classified as part of the region if it fails to exhibit patterns of political interaction similar to the other states around it.

This definition may not be suitable for all research projects, and definitional value is a function both of theoretical perspective and the type of research puzzles that occupy the researcher's attention. Our definition seeks to avoid conceptualizations that offer definitional answers to crucial substantive questions, such as the extent to which regions are formally organized.⁵ In turn, it allows us to ask five salient questions about the nature of regions: to what extent do they differ from each other by the degree to which members are able to develop cooperative relations with each other; why there is variation in the level of structural conflicts within regions; what ability do potential regional members have to stay in or leave their region; why do some regions remain fairly stable over time while others change substantially with regard to their size and type of membership; and finally, are there critical attributes of regions that lead the community of states to evaluate the members of some regions differently than members of other regions?⁶

We expect a number of consequences as a result of this definition, especially from the consistent interaction criterion. It is plausible then that some regions change or disappear altogether (Western versus Eastern Europe), some come into existence and then dissipate (Central Asia), while some states migrate from one region to another (Israel from the Middle East to Europe; Turkey from Europe to the Middle East or even Central Asia), and other states that may belong to no explicit region, regardless of geographical proximity (e. g. Sudan). Some

⁵ If some formal organization is required by definition, then we cannot pursue puzzles focused on conditions under which such organizations are more likely to take place in some regions than in others.

⁶ Our work on status attribution by the community of states has persistently found that the members of two regions (Europe and the Middle East) are awarded hierarchical ranking of status differently than states in other regions, despite controls for regime type, economic and military capabilities, and conformance to global and regional norms of appropriate behavior. See Volgy et al 2013.

geopolitical spaces, regardless of the proximity of their members, and despite consistent attempts by states to forge a region, may never become one (e.g., the Mediterranean; see Rhamey et al. 2014).

In order to operationalize the definition, we follow once more Rhamey (2012) by using an “opportunity and willingness” framework (Most and Starr 1984) to identify patterns of political and economic interactions. First, we determine which states are capable of reaching each other given their capabilities, constituting the opportunity to be part of the region. Among those that qualify (and meet the geographical proximity criterion), we identify states that also engage in actual interactions with each other (willingness). States are considered to have the opportunity and willingness to interact if they clear minimal thresholds on these dimensions, with capabilities measured by a state's GDP modified by their relative political capacity.⁷

The ability of a state to act is not only constrained by its capability, but also limited by geography; therefore we employ Boulding's (1962) loss of power gradient, as refined by Bueno de Mesquita (1981), and apply to each state's proportional share of political capacity modified GDP. Thus, we are able to create “bubbles” of capabilities for each state, with such capabilities decreasing the further the distance from a state's capital. We can then identify each pair of states in a potential region as having sufficient capabilities to reach each other.

In order to measure willingness to interact, we generate a dichotomous variable if a pair of states have an above average amount of political interactions with one another compared to all states globally.⁸ We then integrate the opportunity and willingness dimensions: if two states

⁷ Political capacity is measured by relative political extraction, which scales the value of GDP by the state's ability to extract resources for policy use. See Kugler and Tammen (2012) for further explanation and data.

⁸ We use the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) (1950-1975) (Azar 1980) and the Interstate Data for Events Analysis (1990-2009) (Bond et al 2003) to accomplish this analysis.

exhibit both opportunity and willingness to interact, then they meet our criteria for being potential regional members, assuming they are also linked by geography.

Our next step is to apply clique analysis, a network analysis that identifies actors that choose each other (Wasserman and Faust 1994), to our preliminary results in order to determine whether or not states with the opportunity to interact and the willingness to do so actually cluster together in a unique pattern apart from the broader international system. Clique analysis produces a cluster diagram⁹ grouping similar states. Our regions are constructed from that diagram, with the stipulation that they must cluster together in a group of more than two and also be contiguous or separated by no more than 400 miles of water. The final product of these manipulations is shown in Appendix A at five year intervals.

A Theoretical Framework for Comparative Regional Analysis

Generally we are interested in three sets of puzzles concerning interstate relations within regions. First, what accounts for variation across regions in terms of cooperation? It is clear that some regions have patterns of interstate relations that are highly cooperative while in other regions cooperation is sporadic at best. From a longitudinal perspective, it is also the case that regions go through cycles of more or less cooperation over time. What would explain such changes and are the driving mechanisms associated with them primarily endogenous and exogenous in nature?

The second issue is about patterns of conflict between states in regions: some regions are dominated by intense competition and conflict while other regions are characterized by only sporadic conflicts. It is also the case that patterns of conflicts within regions change over time in

⁹ Clustering takes the form of a dendrogram, wherein subsets of the dendrogram represent similar states determined by the correlation of their opportunity and willingness indicators with other actors in the system.

some regions, but remain consistently high in others. Solingen notes (2007) for example the continuity of conflict in the Middle East versus the reduction of major conflicts in East Asia during the period between 1965 and 2006.

Our third concern is about how these intra-regional dynamics involving conflictual and cooperative politics create implications for global politics. Although not part of this specific effort, it is clear that regional dynamics have substantial implications for global politics, potentially upsetting or facilitating global governance, including drawing into regional politics major powers, diffusing conflicts across regional borders, and perhaps cooperative processes as well (note the efforts of the EU to seek to expand its integrationist practices beyond its borders).

--Figure 1 about here--

There are a number of attributes on which regions can be compared, and we suggest that those attributes provide critical clues about both patterns of conflict and cooperation within regions. These considerations are illustrated in Figure 1. The attributes seek to integrate external involvement in regions, with intra-regional power dynamics, the ability and willingness of states to act in a variety of ways including the creation of cooperative architecture, and the range of intra-state and interstate societal heterogeneity that may create obstacles to cooperation and stimulate further interstate conflicts.

The framework is based on three central assumptions regarding international politics, whether or not the focus is on global or regional relationships between states. The first is that in the absence of a centralized, legitimate authority to govern political affairs between states, much of international (or regional) politics unfolds in the context of hierarchical relationships (Lake 2011, Lemke 2002, Kugler et al 2011, Modelski and Thompson 1996, Rhamey et al. 2014) when

states have the capability to exercise such relationships and are willing to do so. Second, we assume that when such hierarchies are not sustainable (either because a state lacks the power to create the hierarchy or the willingness to do so), the region (or the global system in question) will experience huge uncertainties in the relationships between states, leading to sporadic but unsustainable patterns of cooperation, and conversely, substantial levels of conflicts.

The third assumption is that if they are capable of doing so, regional powers will seek to create economic and security orders in their region. This is not assumed to be so for altruistic purposes. Instead, the motivations are diverse, including both domestic political ones and others related to myriad foreign policy objectives. Clearly, when the region is ordered in terms of security and economic relationship (and consistent with the interests of the regional power), it creates environmental conditions allowing for more stability and less uncertainty in conducting the affairs of the state. While global orders also exist (and may impinge on regional orders), they seldom structure regional relations sufficiently by themselves. Note that we do not assume what mechanisms will be attempted by the regional power in seeking to create such order. It may be done coercively or through a combination of positive and negative inducements (see Ikenberry's 2001 discussion of the trade-offs involved in buying into the American blueprint for order after the end of World War II), and may be contested by regional challengers reluctant to assent to the regional power's leadership. While efforts at regional order creation by regional powers should be salient under most conditions, they may be particularly so when in conflict with global orders (creating incentives for major power intrusion) or when global orders become unstable.

These assumptions guide our framework, which then seeks to map out some of the key ingredients that may have to be managed within regions, depending on the extent to which order and predictability can be created by the strongest of states. Of course, looming over the regional

dynamic are extra-regional major powers that may pursue their own interests in the region, all factors being equal.

Regional Powers, Challengers, and Initial Empirical Observations

Given the hierarchical assumption, the first regional attribute of concern is whether or not a regional power exists in the region, where a regional power is a state with extraordinary amounts of capabilities, foreign policy activity, and status relative to the rest of the region.¹⁰ As Appendix A illustrates, not all regions contain regional powers. By regional power we are referring to a state that has dominant military and economic capabilities in the region, is willing to consistently exercise those capabilities in its interactions with other regional members, and is recognized by other members of the region as being a regional power. Regions that lack a regional power a) are not likely to realize the creation of substantial, viable cooperative architecture; and b) if existing in a dominant global power vacuum, will likely experience high levels of conflict, all factors being equal.

Second within the context of hierarchy is the presence of regional challengers, which may contribute significantly to the degree of instability within the region. While regional powers are those states that possess extraordinary amounts of capabilities, willingness, and status, we define regional challengers broadly as those states within a region that possess extraordinary amounts of two out of three components. However, building on research related to the behavior of major power typologies (Corbetta et al. 2013), we further hypothesize that the extent to which regional challengers are conflictual or cooperative within their regions is contingent upon which of the three components the challenger lacks. Much like a "status inconsistent underachiever" major power, or a strong, active major power that is not granted status by the international

¹⁰ See Cline et al. (2011) for a full discussion of regional power identification.

community (see Volgy et al. 2011), regional challengers that surpass thresholds on capabilities and foreign policy activity but do not receive commensurate status from the region are likely to engage in far more conflictual behavior than other types of regional challengers or regional powers. We label these potentially dangerous states status deficient challengers given their likely desire to alter existing regional politics. The two other types of regional challengers are those that demonstrate extraordinary willingness and are granted regional status, but lack significant capabilities, which we label "weak challengers," and those that possess significant capabilities and are granted status, but lack willingness to engage the region, which we label "reluctant challengers." Given both types of challengers receive status from their regions without either significant capabilities or significant and consistent foreign policy engagement, we expect these states to engage in relatively less conflict than those regional challengers denied status.

This identification of power hierarchy varieties within regions provides a series of comparative expectations regarding the level of conflict and/or cooperation observable within a regional subsystem contingent upon the combination of regional powers and challengers that are present in conjunction with the region's geopolitical positioning vis-à-vis the dominant major powers. A region within a geopolitical space dominated by a single major, extra-regional power, containing a clear regional power and no challengers, we expect to be defined by not only the absence of significant conflicts but also most likely to experience the formation of significant architecture and cooperative interaction. A region, however, in a contested geopolitical space between two or more major powers, without a regional power but containing one or more challengers with significant opportunity and willingness but denied status (status deficient

challengers), we expect to be the most consistently conflictual regions in the international system.

One obvious example of a region that lacks a regional power throughout the post-World War II period (although Saudi Arabia meets our criteria briefly during the late 1990s), and consistently in a contested geopolitical space between dominant major powers, is the Middle East. While a regional power is absent, regional challengers abound. In the most recent time period (2005-2009), Saudi Arabia has the capacity to act as a regional power, but its willingness to do so is belied by the frequency of its political and economic interactions that are aimed at least as much at states outside of the region than within (Cline et al 2011).¹¹ Egypt and Israel during the Cold War are status quo challengers with significant capabilities and willingness, but denied clear status from the region as a whole. In the post-Cold Period, both Egypt and Iran are active and receive status as weak challengers, but lack the extraordinary capabilities that would identify them as regional powers. Unsurprisingly, throughout the time period available in both the COPDAB and IDEA event datasets, the interactions between states in the Middle East region are consistently more conflictual than any other regional space.

While some regions like the Middle East may contain no regional powers, others may contain more than one, though the effect of this multi-power system may be contingent upon broader systemic considerations related to the region's geopolitical position relative to the dominant major powers. Two examples come to mind, with dramatically different consequences. The European region offers a case of no fewer than four regional powers (Germany, France, the UK, and the Russian Federation following the end of the Cold War) with three of them also

¹¹ The latest example of its reluctance to act as either a regional or extra-regional power was demonstrated by its unwillingness to even accept a seat at the United Nations Security Council. See "Saudi Arabia Rejects UN Security Council Seat," *New York Times* (October 18, 2013).

carrying the status and perceived obligations of being major global powers. This dynamic has resulted in the EU and the creation of a highly stable economic order and highly structured cooperative relationships for most of Europe, especially compared to the history of great competition and conflict prior to World War II.

East Asia provides another regional example with more than one global power nested in the region (China and Japan). While China has been recognized as a regional power and now carries with it the status as a global power as well, its relationship with Japan has remained contentious and the two powers have not been able to either cooperate sufficiently to create a stable regional order similar to the EU,¹² nor to even resolve deep-seated security issues without the interference of external powers. Yet, the very existence of both major players in the region has brought about substantial positive developments in economic relationships in the region, and their security issues, while remaining contentious, have not flared into the types of conflicts witnessed in the Middle East.

Three regions exemplify geopolitical spaces with one regional power, albeit reflecting substantial differences in the capacity and willingness of the regional leader to create economic and security orders. In South America, Brazil has had the economic and military capacity, and the willingness to order routinized economic relationships with its neighbors, while border disputes and other security issues have been kept to a minimum compared to earlier eras. In South Asia, India as a regional power has dwarfed the capabilities of its neighbors, yet it has not created either the economic or the security conditions for a stable regional order. In Southern Africa, the Republic of South Africa is clearly the regional power in the region, yet is perhaps

¹² In fact East Asia has the fewest formal intergovernmental organizations with substantial autonomy of any major region in international politics (Volgy et al. 2011). Yet, the informal mechanisms developed in Asia appear to work better than the formal IGO's developed in the Middle East without the coordination of a regional power.

the weakest of all the above in both military and economic capabilities, and preoccupied with a broad range of domestic economic, social, and political problems, making the creation of a stable and prosperous order in the region highly problematic.

These varied examples suggest a number of propositions. First, the existence of a regional power in a region is probably a necessary, albeit an insufficient condition for the creation of structured cooperative relationships between states and for the development of a stable regional security regime. Second, in order to accomplish such order, the regional power must have not only sufficient capabilities to create such order and to entice or coerce others to participate in it, but also the willingness to do so. Willingness to order the region is probably a function of both external threat perceptions (should it fail to do so), but as well, domestic political and economic motivations for doing so.

Finally, the European experience suggests another proposition: it may take more than two major powers in a region to secure economic regional orders that require surrendering a substantial degree of sovereignty by the states in the region, including even major powers that are the region's members. Of course the caution we raise here is obvious: given the history of enormous conflict between these powers prior to World War II, it may take dramatic conditions both in the region and globally for more than two regional powers to collaborate on such arrangements.¹³

For regional challengers, Table 1 provides the average number of cooperative events in the COPDAB and IDEA datasets per conflictual event for each type contingent upon whether there is a regional power within the region with the challenger, underscoring the particularly

¹³ Yet, such dramatic events may not be enough to create structured cooperative arrangements between major powers in a region: the case in point is East Asia after World War II.

dangerous nature for regional stability of status deficient challengers as well as the generally pacifying effect of regional powers. While the violence seemingly endemic to regions with status quo challengers and no regional powers is embodied by the Middle East since 1950, it is also relevant to the evolution in cooperation and conflict of other regional spaces. For example, China is a status deficient challenger throughout the 1950s and 1960s and engages in remarkable amounts of conflict, notably different from post-Cold War Chinese foreign policy which, while not without conflictual behavior, is far more cooperative, including being the only major power that has not engaged in a third party intervention in a militarized interstate dispute since the end of the Cold War (Corbetta et al 2013). This shift in the regional hierarchy of East Asia coincides with what many have also observed as a decline in the amount of conflict in the region (e.g. Solingen 2007).

--Table 1 about here--

Similarly, anecdotes abound of the less violent behavior of weak and reluctant challengers compared to their status deficient challenger counterparts. Weak challengers include Mexico, Belgium, and Argentina - all states that are active in their regional spaces, and at times desiring changes in the status quo - but rarely rely on conflict to achieve their aims. When they do, as occasionally was the case for Argentina, their weakness in capabilities becomes quickly evident. Reluctant challengers provide a more interesting example, as the only element lacking in their rise to regional power status is a political willingness to engage the region. However, that absence of foreign policy activity often leads to regions that are less stable than they otherwise would be. Again, using South America as an example, Brazil is a reluctant challenger throughout the Cold War, but a regional power in the post-Cold War era. South America,

likewise, was a space of periodic conflict during the Cold War, but today one of the most peaceful regional spaces.

While we consider the existence and nature of the regional powers and challengers operating in the region to be a highly salient consideration for determining patterns of cooperation or conflict, as Figure 1 suggests, it is certainly not the only salient consideration. Highly important are a variety of obstacles to regional order emanating both from within and without the region, and our brief empirical discussion of challengers is but a cursory example.¹⁴

Given this initial conceptual and descriptive inventory, we suggest the following additional testable propositions that would facilitate the creation of stable regional orders:

1) Where territorial disputes have been substantially resolved. This is clearly the case in Western Europe and more recently in South and North America. It is clearly not the case in the Middle East, large swathes of Sub-Saharan Africa, and in East Asia.

2) Where historic rivalries between major states in the region have been minimized. Interstate rivalries between Germany and France in Europe, Brazil and Argentina in South America, and between the U.S. and Mexico in North America reflect these changes. Conversely, continued rivalry between the two Koreas, China and Japan, Israel and Iran, Rwanda and the Congo—to name a few examples—continue unabated, with consequences that threaten to diffuse these conflicts to other parts of the region.

3) Where major challengers to the dominant regional power are lacking. We propose that the extent to which substantial challengers arise in the region to contest the status of the

¹⁴ Note, an empirical analysis, potentially of multi-level nature to incorporate certain relevant systemic characteristics, would be more appropriate than the descriptive information we have thus far provided, and is the next step for this project.

dominant regional actor, virtually all aspects of order in the region will be contested and the challenge will likely defuse across the region.

4) Where either there are relatively homogeneous groupings or where heterogeneous populations have reached political accommodation and political integration, either within the states constituting the region or across state boundaries. Ethnic and social conflicts constitute critical obstacles to the creation and management of regional order, and even when they are contained within states, they often spill over across sovereign boundaries. As Rasler and Thompson (2014) demonstrate, both internal and external incongruence, especially linked with state legitimacy, predict significantly to at least substantial domestic conflict in regions. Whether or not this is the case for inter-state conflict still needs to be demonstrated but similar results should not be surprising.

5) Where the level of state regime competence is high. Political systems vary greatly in terms of their competence to manage their internal politics, and especially in terms of the efficient extraction of societal resources for political purposes. In regions dominated by states with weak and inefficient governments, the ability to create economic and security orders should be especially problematic. Regions are likely to vary substantially in the composition of member states on this domestic political dimension. Rasler and Thompson (2014) find little relationship between political extraction (albeit not legitimacy) and *domestic* conflict. Our preliminary analysis suggests that at the monadic level, and for democracies, high levels of political extraction (at least in democracies) appear to be related to reduced expenditures on external

affairs and lowers levels of external conflict.¹⁵ Whether these preliminary results at the monadic level translate to the regional level remains to be tested.

Finally, the framework is suggestive of three global concerns that are likely to effectuate the creation of regional order and to impact on the extent of conflict and cooperation in a region:

The first is the extent of intrusion into the region by major, global powers. We propose that such intrusions may exacerbate conflict or facilitate cooperation depending on the issues reviewed above, but is less likely to occur when a) a regional power has created substantial and relatively uncontested security and economic order; and b) such regional order is not substantially at variance with attempts to create global orders.

Second, regions vary substantially in terms of the degree to which they are enmeshed or relatively isolated from globalization processes. We propose that the more central a region is to either global economic or security processes, the more difficulty the extant regional power will have in fashioning security and economic orders distinct from global processes.

Third, we suggest that regions vary substantially in the level of status its members enjoy from the global community of states (Bezerra et al. 2014). To the extent that status conveys a form of soft power, we propose that the higher the aggregate status of a region, the more likely it will be able to insulate itself from intrusive states outside of the region, and to be able to conduct more cooperative relations with members of other regions. In turn, we have found that states in regions with uniquely high levels of cooperative or conflictual dynamics (Europe and the Middle East respectively) are ranked differently on the international status hierarchy than states in other

¹⁵ We believe this to be the case due to the following causal mechanism: leaders in democracies must provide public goods to stay in office; high political extraction translates to higher expectations and therefore higher levels of public demand for better and greater provision of domestic public goods, reducing the ability of policy makers to expend more resources on foreign affairs.

regions, partially offsetting the typical drivers of status attribution used by the community of states (Miller et al. 2014).¹⁶

Conclusion

The theoretical framework we propose seeks to integrate three different levels of analysis in the study of international politics while highlighting the salience of interstate politics in regions. Whereas we focus briefly here on the identification and description of intra-regional hierarchies, it is but a first step in a framework that may then further incorporate both system dynamics and state-level characteristics that may provide a more complete comparative approach to understanding regional politics.¹⁷ We hope that it constitutes a salient first set of steps in pursuing inquiry regarding the wide range of variation across regions including the extent to which some exhibit primarily patterns of cooperation while others yield consistently long-term patterns of conflict among their members. We, and we hope others as well, will proceed to the next stages of refining the framework, and testing its key propositions.

¹⁶ Note that these regional differences appear in our models even after we control for regime type, economic size, wealth, military capabilities, and behavioral congruence with widely accepted global norms of foreign policy behavior.

¹⁷ For one initial attempt, see Rhamey 2012.

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Figure 1: Key Concepts to assess variation in patterns of conflict and cooperation in regions.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

<i>CONCEPT</i>	<i>VARIATION</i>			
Regional Power	None	Exists but in rivalry	Exists but is weak	Strong and creates order
Major regional challenger	None	Exists but weak		Exists in strong challenge
Major power intrusion	Seldom	Intermittent	Relatively constant	Relatively constant and challenged by other major powers
Hierarchical space	Dominance vacuum			Hierarchical space
Organizational architecture	Weak and mostly informal			Complex with some IGO autonomy
Region's aggregate global status	Low			High
Region's level of globalization	Low			High
Political competence of states in the region	Mostly weak states			Mostly strong states
Extent of societal heterogeneity within and between states in region	Low			High on both

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Intra-regional inter-state conflict	Low			High
Region's level of intra-state conflict	Low			High
Extent of cooperation between states in the region	Low			High

Table 1: Average Number of Cooperative Events per Conflictual Event Annually of Regional Challenger Types in Regions with or without a Regional Power, 1950-1975 & 1990-2009.¹⁸

	<i>Region has a Regional Power</i>	<i>Region does not have a Regional Power</i>	<i>All Regions</i>
Weak Challengers	24.42 (sig)	8.08 (sig)	13.88
Reluctant Challengers	3.74*	27.96	25.76
Status Deficient Challengers	13.01	1.45	7.23
All Challengers Types	18.55	11.65	14.06

*Only includes China, 1970-1974

¹⁸ A difference in means test suggests the means for weak and status deficient challengers contingent upon whether there is a regional power or is not is significant at .94, across only 31 observations for weak challengers and 21 for status deficient challengers. The difference for reluctant challenger with a regional power versus reluctant challenger without a regional power is inconclusive given only 1 data point for reluctant challengers with a regional power. The pooled population means for all challenger types are not statistically significantly different contingent upon whether the region does or does not have a regional power [$\Pr(T > t) = .32$], suggesting the importance of distinguishing between challenger types given the presence of a regional challenger. Future research will include regions without regional challengers and powers as additional observations to test the significance of these designations relative to outcomes of interest for comparative regionalist research.

Appendix A: A Delineation of Regions in International Politics, Five Year Intervals.

Regions 1950-1954:

<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Northern Europe</u>	<u>Near East</u>	<u>Middle East</u>	<u>Asia – Pacific</u>
United States**	United Kingdom**	Belgium*	Iraq	Ethiopia	China*
Canada	Ireland	Luxembourg	Syria*	Saudi Arabia	Taiwan
Cuba	Netherlands	Sweden	Lebanon	Y. A. R.	South Korea
Haiti	France**	Denmark	Jordan		Japan**
Dominican Rep.	Switzerland		Israel		India**
Mexico	Spain				Pakistan
Guatemala	Portugal				Burma
Honduras	East Germany				Sri Lanka
El Salvador	Poland				Nepal
Nicaragua	Hungary				Thailand
Costa Rica	Czechoslovakia				Cambodia
Panama	Italy				Laos
Colombia	Albania				N. Vietnam
Venezuela	Yugoslavia				S. Vietnam
Ecuador	Greece				Philippines
Peru	Bulgaria				Indonesia
Brazil	Romania				Australia
Bolivia	Soviet Union**				New Zealand
Paraguay	Finland				
Chile	Iceland				
Argentina*	Liberia				
Uruguay	South Africa				
	Libya				
	Iran				
	Turkey				
	Afghanistan				

Note: States not listed are “border states” that, due to strong commonalities with two or more proximate regional clusterings, cannot be placed in a single region by the method discussed.

****Regional Power * Regional Challenger**

Regions 1955-1959:

<u>North America</u>	<u>Central America</u>	<u>Northern South America</u>	<u>South America</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Northern Europe</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>Sahel</u>	<u>Middle East</u>	<u>Asia-Pacific</u>
United States**	El Salvador	Haiti	Brazil*	United Kingdom**	Netherlands**	Hungary	Libya	Iraq	Afghanistan
Canada	Nicaragua*	Dominican Republic	Paraguay	Ireland	Belgium*	Bulgaria*	Sudan	U.A. R.*	China*
Cuba	Costa Rica*	Colombia	Chile	France*	Luxembourg	Romania*	Y.A.R.	Lebanon	Mongolia
Mexico	Panama	Venezuela*	Argentina	Switzerland	Sweden			Jordan	Taiwan
Honduras		Ecuador	Uruguay	Spain	Norway			Israel	North Korea
		Peru*		Portugal	Denmark			Saudi Arabia	South Korea
		Bolivia		West Germany					Japan**
				East Germany					India**
				Poland					Burma
				Austria					Sri Lanka
				Czechoslovakia					Nepal
				Italy					Thailand
				Greece					Cambodia
				Soviet Union*					Laos
				Iceland					N. Vietnam
				Guinea					S. Vietnam
				Liberia					Malaysia
				Ghana					Philippines
				South Africa					Indonesia
				Morocco					Australia
				Tunisia					New Zealand
				Turkey					

Note: States not listed are “border states” that, due to strong commonalities with two or more proximate regional clusterings, cannot be placed in a single region by the method discussed.

****Regional Power * Regional Challenger**

Regions 1960-1964:

<u>North</u>	<u>Central</u>	<u>Northern South</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Benelux</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>Central</u>	<u>East Africa</u>	<u>Near</u>	<u>Middle East</u>	<u>Asia</u>	<u>Northeast</u>	<u>Asia-</u>
<u>America</u>	<u>America</u>	<u>America</u>	<u>America</u>				<u>Africa</u>	<u>Africa</u>		<u>East</u>			<u>Asia</u>	<u>Pacific</u>
United States	El Salvador*	Haiti	Brazil*	U. K.*	Netherlands	Poland	Niger	Cameroon*	D.R.C.*	Turkey*	Sudan	Iran	N. Korea	Taiwan
Canada	Nicaragua	Dominican Republic	Paraguay	Ireland	Belgium	Hungary	CDI**	Nigeria*	Uganda	Iraq	Saudi Arabia*	Afghanistan	S. Korea	Thailand
Cuba	Costa Rica*	Trinidad and Tobago	Chile	France**	Luxembourg	Czechoslovakia	Guinea	Gabon	Kenya	Syria	Y.A.R.	China*	Japan**	Malaysia
	Panama	Colombia	Argentina*	Switzerland		Albania	U.V.	C.A.R.	Tanzania	Lebanon	Kuwait	India**		Philippines
		Venezuela*	Uruguay	Spain		Yugoslavia		Chad	Zanzibar	Jordan		Pakistan		Indonesia*
		Ecuador		Portugal		Greece			Burundi	Israel		Burma		Australia*
		Peru		W. Germany**		Bulgaria			Rwanda			Sri Lanka		N.Z.
		Bolivia		E. Germany		Romania			Somalia*			Nepal		
				Austria		Soviet Union**			Ethiopia					
				Italy		Egypt			Zambia					
				Sweden					Malawi					
				Norway					South					
									Africa					
									Madagascar					
				Denmark										
				Iceland										
				Senegal										
				Mauritania										
				Morocco										
				Algeria										
				Tunisia										

Note: States not listed are “border states” that, due to strong commonalities with two or more proximate regional clusterings, cannot be placed in a single region by the method discussed.

***Regional Power * Regional Challenger.*

Regions 1965-1969:

<u>North America</u>	<u>Northern South America</u>	<u>South America</u>	<u>Western Europe</u>	<u>Benelux</u>	<u>Northern Europe</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>West Africa</u>	<u>East Africa</u>	<u>Near East</u>	<u>Middle East</u>	<u>Asia</u>	<u>Maritime S.E. Asia</u>
United States	Haiti	Brazil*	U.K.	Netherlands	Finland	E. Germany	Gambia	R.O.C.	Greece	Iraq	Afghanistan	Taiwan
Canada	Dominican Republic	Paraguay	Ireland	Belgium	Sweden**	Poland	Mali	D.R.C.	Cyprus	Egypt	China**	Thailand
Cuba	Trinidad and Tobago	Chile*	France**	Luxembourg*	Norway	Austria	Senegal	Uganda	Iran	Syria	Mongolia	Cambodia
Jamaica	Barbados	Argentina*	Switzerland		Denmark	Hungary	Benin	Kenya*	Turkey*	Lebanon	N. Korea	Laos
Mexico	Colombia	Uruguay	Spain			Czechoslovakia	Mauritania	Tanzania		Jordan	S. Korea	Malaysia
Guatemala	Venezuela		Portugal			Yugoslavia	Niger	Burundi		Israel*	Japan	Singapore
Honduras	Guyana		W. Germany*			Bulgaria	CDI	Rwanda		Saudi	India*	Philippines
El Salvador	Ecuador		Italy			Romania	Guinea	Somalia		Kuwait	Pakistan	Indonesia
Nicaragua	Peru		Iceland			Soviet Union**	U.V.	Ethiopia*			Sri Lanka	Australia*
Costa Rica	Bolivia		Morocco				Liberia	Zambia			Maldives	New Zealand
Panama			Algeria				S.L.	Zimbabwe			Nepal	
			Tunisia				Ghana*	Malawi				
							Togo	S. Africa				
							Cameroon	Lesotho				
							Nigeria**	Botswana				
							Gabon	Swaziland				
							C.A.R.	Madagascar				
							Chad	Mauritius				
							Libya	Sudan				

Note: States not listed are "border states" that, due to strong commonalities with two or more proximate regional clusterings, cannot be placed in a single region by the method discussed.

***Regional Power * Regional Challenger.*

Regions 1970-1974:

<u>North America</u>	<u>South America</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>Maghreb</u>	<u>West Africa</u>	<u>Southern Africa</u>	<u>East Africa</u>	<u>Near East</u>	<u>South Asia</u>	<u>Northeast Asia</u>	<u>Maritime S.E. Asia</u>
United States*	Brazil*	U.K.**	East Germany	Morocco	Gambia	R.O.C.	Uganda	Iraq	Iran*	N. Korea	Thailand*
Canada	Bolivia	Ireland	Poland	Algeria	Mali	D.R.C.*	Kenya	Syria	China	S. Korea	Cambodia
Bahama	Paraguay	Netherlands	Hungary*	Tunisia	Senegal	Tanzania*	Rwanda	Lebanon	India**	Japan	Laos
Cuba	Chile	Belgium*	Czechoslovakia		Benin	Zanzibar	Somalia	Jordan	Bhutan		Malaysia
Haiti	Argentina*	Luxembourg	Yugoslavia		Mauritania	Zambia	Ethiopia	Israel*	Pakistan*		Singapore
Dom. Rep.	Uruguay	France*	Bulgaria		Niger	Zimbabwe	Sudan		Bangladesh		Philippines
Jamaica		Switzerland	Romania*		CDI	Malawi			Sri Lanka		Indonesia
T. & T.		Spain	Soviet Union**		Guinea	South Africa*			Maldives		Australia**
Barbados		Portugal			U.V.	Lesotho			Nepal		New Zealand
Grenada		West Germany*			Liberia	Botswana					Fiji
Mexico*		Italy*			S.L.	Swaziland					
Guatemala		Malta			Ghana	Madagascar					
Honduras		Greece			Togo	Mauritius					
El Salvador		Sweden			Cameroon						
Nicaragua		Norway			Nigeria**						
Costa Rica		Denmark			Chad						
Panama		Iceland									
Colombia		Turkey									
Venezuela*											
Guyana											
Ecuador											
Peru											

Note: States not listed are “border states” that, due to strong commonalities with two or more proximate regional clusterings, cannot be placed in a single region by the method discussed.

***Regional Power * Regional Challenger.*

Regions 1990-1994:

<u>North America</u>	<u>South America</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Central Asia</u>	<u>Maghreb</u>	<u>West Africa</u>	<u>Southern Africa</u>	<u>E. Africa</u>	<u>Middle East</u>	<u>South Asia</u>	<u>East Asia</u>
U.S.**	Brazil**	Iceland	Kazakhstan	Morocco	Liberia	D.R.C.	Sudan	Egypt*	India**	China*
Canada	Ecuador	Ireland	Uzbekistan	Algeria	CDI*	Angola*	Ethiopia	Syria	Pakistan*	Nepal
Mexico	Peru	U.K.**	Kyrgyzstan	Tunisia	Ghana*	Zambia	Uganda	Jordan	Oman	Bhutan
Guatemala	Bolivia	Spain	Tajikistan	Libya	Togo	Zimbabwe*	Kenya	Saudi	Yemen	Bangladesh
Belize	Chile	France**	Afghanistan	Portugal	Benin	Namibia	Rwanda		Qatar	Myanmar
El Salvador	Paraguay	Belgium			Nigeria**	Botswana	Burundi		Sri Lanka	Thailand
Nicaragua	Argentina	Luxembourg				South Africa**	Tanzania		Maldives	Laos
Costa Rica	Uruguay	Netherlands				Lesotho				Vietnam
Panama		Switzerland								Cambodia
Colombia		Italy								Singapore
Venezuela		Germany**								Malaysia
Cuba		Denmark								N. Korea
Haiti		Norway								S. Korea
		Sweden								Japan**
		Finland								Taiwan
		Slovenia								Philippines
		Croatia								Brunei
		Yugoslavia*								Indonesia
		Czech Rep.								Australia
		Slovakia								New Zealand
		Albania								Fiji
		Greece								
		Turkey								
		Israel								
		Bulgaria								
		Romania								
		Moldova								
		Poland								
		Latvia								
		Lithuania								
		Estonia								
		Bosnia*								
		Russia**								

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***Regional Power * Regional Challenger.*

Regions 1995-1999:

<u>North America</u>	<u>South America</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Central Asia</u>	<u>West Africa</u>	<u>Southern Africa</u>	<u>E. Africa</u>	<u>Middle East</u>	<u>South Asia</u>	<u>East Asia</u>
U.S.**	Brazil**	Iceland	Kazakhstan	Liberia	D.R.C.*	Sudan	Egypt	India**	China**
Canada	Ecuador	Ireland	Uzbekistan	CDI	Angola*	Ethiopia	Syria	Pakistan	Nepal
Mexico*	Peru	U.K.**	Kyrgyzstan	Ghana	Zambia	Uganda	Jordan	Sri Lanka	Bhutan
Guatemala	Bolivia	Spain	Tajikistan	Togo*	Zimbabwe	Kenya	Saudi**	Maldives	Bangladesh
Belize	Chile	France**	Afghanistan	Benin	Namibia	Rwanda	Iraq		Myanmar
El Salvador	Paraguay	Belgium		Nigeria**	Botswana	Tanzania	Iran*		Thailand
Nicaragua	Argentina	Luxembourg			South Africa*				Laos
Costa Rica	Uruguay	Netherlands			Lesotho				Vietnam
Panama		Switzerland			Burundi				Cambodia
Colombia		Italy*							Singapore
Venezuela		Germany**							Malaysia
Cuba		Denmark							N. Korea
Haiti		Norway							S. Korea
		Sweden							Japan**
		Finland							Taiwan
		Slovenia							Philippines
		Croatia							Brunei
		Yugoslavia*							Indonesia
		Czech Rep.							Australia
		Slovakia							New Zealand
		Albania							Fiji
		Greece							
		Turkey							
		Israel							
		Bulgaria							
		Romania							
		Moldova							
		Poland							
		Latvia							
		Lithuania							
		Estonia							
		Bosnia							
		Russia*							
		Macedonia							
		Portugal							

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***Regional Power * Regional Challenger.*

Regions 2000-2004:

<u>North America</u>	<u>South America</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>West Africa</u>	<u>Southern Africa</u>	<u>Middle East</u>	<u>South Asia</u>	<u>East Asia</u>
U.S.**	Brazil**	Iceland	Guinea	D.R.C.	Egypt	India**	China**
Canada	Ecuador	Ireland	S. L.	Angola	Saudi	Pakistan*	Nepal
Mexico*	Peru	U.K.**	Liberia	Zambia	U.A.E.	Sri Lanka	Bhutan
Cuba	Bolivia	Spain		Zimbabwe		Maldives	Fiji
	Chile	France**		Namibia		Bangladesh	Myanmar
	Paraguay	Belgium		Botswana			Thailand
	Argentina	Luxembourg		South Africa**			Laos
	Uruguay	Netherlands		Lesotho			Vietnam
		Switzerland		Burundi			Cambodia
		Italy*		Congo			Singapore
		Germany**		Rwanda			Malaysia
		Denmark		Uganda			N. Korea*
		Norway		Kenya			S. Korea
		Sweden		Tanzania			Japan*
		Finland		Malawi			Taiwan
		Slovenia		Mozambique			Philippines
		Croatia		Swaziland			Brunei
		Serbia		Comoros			Indonesia
		Czech Rep.		Mauritius			Australia
		Slovakia		Madagascar			New Zealand
		Albania		Seychelles			
		Greece					
		Turkey					
		Israel					
		Bulgaria					
		Romania					
		Moldova					
		Poland					
		Latvia					
		Lithuania					
		Iran					
		Azerbaijan					
		Syria					
		Iraq					
		Estonia					
		Bosnia					
		Armenia					
		Russia**					
		Macedonia					
		Portugal					
		Monaco					
		Andorra					
		Belarus					
		Georgia					
		Lichtenstein					
		San Marino					
		Cyprus					
		Ukraine					
		Montenegro					

Note: States not listed are “border states” that, due to strong commonalities with two or more proximate regional clusterings, cannot be placed in a single region by the method discussed.

***Regional Power * Regional Challenger.*

Regions 2005-2009:

<u>Northern America</u>	<u>Central America</u>	<u>South America</u>	<u>U. K.**</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>West Africa</u>	<u>Southern Africa</u>	<u>Horn of Africa</u>	<u>Maghreb</u>	<u>Middle East</u>	<u>Central Asia</u>	<u>East Asia</u>	<u>South Asia</u>
United States**	Haiti	Ecuador	Ireland	Bulgaria	Ivory Coast	D.R.C.	Somalia	Algeria	Sudan	Afghanistan	China**	India**
Canada	Jamaica	Peru	Netherlands	Moldova	Guinea	Congo	Djibouti	Tunisia	Iran	Tajikistan	Mongolia	Pakistan
Cuba	Belize	Brazil**	Belgium	Romania	Liberia	Uganda	Ethiopia	Libya	Iraq	Uzbekistan	Taiwan	Bangladesh
Mexico	Honduras	Bolivia	Luxembourg	Russia**	Sierra Leone	Kenya	Eritrea		Egypt		North Korea	Sri Lanka
	El Salvador	Paraguay	France**	Estonia	Ghana	Tanzania	Yemen		Syria		South Korea	Maldives
	Nicaragua	Chile	Monaco	Latvia	Togo	Burundi			Lebanon		Japan**	
	Costa Rica	Argentina	Liechtenstein	Lithuania	Nigeria**	Rwanda			Saudi Arabia*		Bhutan	
	Panama	Uruguay	Switzerland	Ukraine		Angola			Kuwait		Myanmar	
	Venezuela**		Spain*	Belarus		Mozambique			Bahrain		Nepal	
			Andorra	Armenia		Zambia			Qatar		Thailand	
			Portugal	Georgia		Zimbabwe			U. A. E.		Cambodia	
			Germany**	Azerbaijan		Malawi					Laos	
			Poland	Finland		South Africa**					Vietnam	
			Austria	Sweden		Namibia					Malaysia	
			Hungary	Norway		Lesotho					Singapore	
			Czech Republic	Denmark		Botswana					Brunei	
			Slovakia	Iceland		Swaziland					Philippines	
			Italy	Turkey		Madagascar					Indonesia	
			San Marino	Israel		Comoros					East Timor	
			Malta			Mauritius					Australia*	
			Albania			Seychelles					New Zealand	
			Montenegro								Vanuata	
			Macedonia								Solomon Islands	
			Croatia								Kiribati	
			Serbia								Tuvalu	
			Bosnia								Fiji	
			Kosovo								Togo	
			Slovenia								Nauru	
			Greece								Marshall Islands	
			Cyprus								Palau	
											Micronesia	
											Samoa	
											Papua New Guinea	

Note: States not listed are "border states" that, due to strong commonalities with two or more proximate regional clusterings, cannot be placed in a single region by the method discussed.

***Regional Power * Regional Challenger.*